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THE PATENT LOTTERY: EXPLOITING BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON GOOD
Dennis D. Crouch*
INTRODUCTION
Incentives are critically important to patent law. The truth is, however,
that our patent system is built primarily on assumptions about how incen-
tives operate. The standard assumption is that today's enforcement of pat-
ents will promote tomorrow's innovation and disclosure. But researchers
have not fully explored the incentive value of patent rights, especially in
relation to the incentives felt by entrepreneurs and individual inventors.
Some studies do suggest that relatively small-time operators are captured by
an overly optimistic outlook on their chances for success and may be in-
vesting in a losing game.' This Article focuses on the bounded rationality of
certain would-be innovators and examines policies that use those choices to
increase the social benefit of patents.
While many applaud patents as tools for promoting innovation,2 others
deride them as supporting an artificial market structure ripe with potential
monopolistic business activities and excessive litigation.' These potentially
negative results of patent protection create a powerful counterbalance
against policies that further increase patent protection. Policymakers' un-
derstanding of both the upside and downside of patent protection is impor-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri Law School. Special thanks to Professors
Michael Meurer, Douglas Lichtman, John Duffy, Mark Lemley, and Glynn Lunney, whose comments
were both pointed and extremely helpful. In addition, I am grateful for the many comments and sugges-
tions that I received while presenting portions of this paper at various locales, including Boston College,
William & Mary, Franklin Pierce, University of Missouri, the Works in Progress Intellectual Property
(WIPIP) Colloquium, and my Patent Policy seminar at Boston University. The errors that remain are my
own.
1 U.S. Patent No. 6,556,992 (filed Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sectl =PTO I &Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p= 1&u-/o2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=
l&f-G&I=50&sl=6556992.PN.&OS=PN/6556992&RS=PN/6556992 ("[T]he so-called 'lottery effect'
may encourage some to over-invest in highly speculative technologies that have the seductive allure of
potentially huge economic rewards but very little if any realistic probability of success.").
2 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977) ("The patent is a reward that enables the inventor to capture the returns from his investment
in the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to appropriation by others.").
3 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 26 (2005);
see Adam K. Cramer, Giving Patents an Upgrade, PC MAG., Aug. 1, 2008, at 20 ("From 2005 to 2007
only one of the 30 [patent infringement] lawsuits Cisco battled in court was brought by a company that
made anything.").
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tant so they can better calibrate the rights granted: making them strong
enough to help induce innovation and development while limiting monopo-
listic problems. The patent laws include dozens of policy levers, such as the
length of the patent term; level of nonobviousness required for patentabil-
ity; and type of relief available against infringers. These policy levers cali-
brate the patent rights.
As with almost any novel enterprise, the potential payout of innovation
and patenting is highly skewed. One example of the skew is patent valua-
tion. The majority of issued patents are relatively worthless, as the holder
never asserts, licenses, or even leverages the asset.4 A sizable number are
worth enough to repay the associated costs of research, but only a few are
highly valuable (hereinafter "successful"). This low odds structure is com-
parable to a lottery where players have a low probability of winning a large
jackpot. Although more empirical work is necessary, behavioral science
provides some indications of how potential innovators make decisions in-
volving low-probability, high-payout events.5 Interestingly, entrepreneurs
and individual inventors fall in line with lottery players whose lottery in-
vestments are quite sensitive to the size of the jackpot but are relatively
insensitive to the probability of winning. In other words, for lottery players,
a small increase in the size of a jackpot tends to induce a disproportionally
large increase in lottery purchases, while a comparable increase in the prob-
ability of winning the jackpot would engender a lesser response. In a paral-
lel fashion for potential innovators, a shift in the value of successful innova-
tion tends to outweigh a proportional change in the likelihood of success. If
these innovative entities do indeed overweigh their chances of success, then
it also follows that a reduced and perhaps negative expected return on in-
vestment could still encourage their innovative activities. The state-run lot-
tery system understands this "lottery effect," focusing its marketing efforts
on the jackpot size while largely ignoring information about the odds of
success. 6 The patent system, however, has not taken advantage of its own
lottery effect. This Article develops a model of innovation incentives based
on an understanding of the "patent lottery effect" and how the implementa-
tion of patent policy choices may alter innovative behavior.
In rough patent terms, we can think of policies that marginally in-
crease the potential size of the patent reward as having more impact on in-
novative activity than do those that marginally increase the probability of
obtaining value from a patent. The benefits of using intellectual property as
an innovation incentive must be balanced with concerns of holdup costs and
potential monopoly harms. The lottery effect provides a tool that may help
4 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 5, 14.
5 Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 64-
67 (2002).
6 Philip J. Cook & Charles T. Clotfelter, The Peculiar Scale Economies of Lotto, 83 AM. ECON.
REv. 634, 637-38 (1993).
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weaken the connection between these otherwise linked pros and cons. Spe-
cifically, the varying marginal impact of different policy levers means that
certain levers may increase an incentive to innovate with only a small in-
crease in the monopoly harm of patents while other levers may be used to
decrease the monopoly harm of patents with only a limited impact on inno-
vation incentives.
Of course, the lottery effect only explains a subset of innovation incen-
tives. Thus, policymakers must take care to design policies that do not un-
duly disturb other innovation incentives that operate in parallel with the
lottery incentive, such as innovation in response to customer demands. My
proposed policy guidelines fit well with the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.7 and KSR International v. Tele-
flex, Inc.,' which present helpful case studies.
This Article discusses evidence supporting a conclusion that the lottery
effect explains some innovation behavior. Proof of such a concept, how-
ever, is well outside the scope of this examination. Rather, this Article pre-
sumes that the patent lottery effect is real and examines the resulting impli-
cations for patent law policy. Part I introduces the lottery effect and its de-
velopment in behavioral economics. Part II applies the lottery effect to the
patent system and discusses criticisms of applying the lottery analogy. Part
III develops the model for exploiting the patent lottery effect by selectively
applying policy levers. To conclude, Part IV discusses the case study of
eBay v. MercExchange.
I. BETTING ON LONG ODDS
A. Behavioral Theory and Long Odds
Expected utility theory is based on an economic model of rational be-
havior that traditionally assumes that decisionmakers are risk-averse.9 For
instance, given the choice of taking a guaranteed $3,000 or an eighty-
percent chance on $4,000, the rational actor may well choose the sure thing
even though the expected $3,200 payout of the gamble is higher.1 In their
7 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
8 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
9 Risk aversion and its corollary of decreasing marginal utility can be explained with the intuitive
example of a millionaire who would likely do less work for another ten dollars than would a pauper. See
Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279,
279-80 (1948) (discussing economists' use of utility and marginal utility in analyzing occupational
choices).
10 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 266 (1979).
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groundbreaking work on prospect theory" and behavioral economics,
Daniel Kahneman 2 and Amos Tversky report numerous experimental ex-
amples where real people making decisions did not exhibit the expected
rational behavior.'3 In one area of study, they found that decisions concern-
ing unlikely events typically appear to be based on an overweighting of the
probabilities of the events' occurrences. 4 Academics have spilled much ink
in the literature attempting to explain why we overvalue long odds, al-
though no real consensus exists. 5
11 Application of prospect theory in patent law is a bit confusing because of Edmund Kitch's
entirely unrelated "prospect theory of patents." See Kitch, supra note 2, at 276 (arguing that granting
patent rights to a single entity encourages further investment and development in that technological
prospect by the patent owner); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 486-91 (2004) (extending Kitch's theory). Because of the confusion, I propose that, at least
for the area of patent law, the term "prospect theory" be abandoned in favor of the broader term "behav-
ioral economics."
12 Kahneman was awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel in 2002 "for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, espe-
cially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty." The Sveriges Riksbank
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002, http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/econ-
omics/laureates/2002/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
13 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 10, at 265-69; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343-46 (1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S262-70 (1986); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 455-56
(1981). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (distinguishing between homo economicus and "real
people").
14 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 10, at 263 ("Overweighting of low probabilities may con-
tribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling.").
15 Edward McCaffery succinctly combines these attempts into three short paragraphs. Edward J.
McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 71, 77-78. A more thor-
ough approach is explored in Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 13, at 1477-79 (noting in particular
issues of bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest). See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHR. L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997) (discussing, inter alia, self-
serving bias, unrealistic optimism, and overconfidence); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000); Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, Rank-Dependent Probabilities, 100 ECON. J. 487,
487 (1990); Lloyd R. Cohen, The Lure of the Lottery, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 712-15 (2001)
(reminding us of the utility of savoring the game); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003) (explaining lottery-like investment behavior of
many middle-class individuals as follows: "[alt bottom, we suspect, is a utility function that favors a
remote chance of striking it rich over the slow but steady gains from buying and holding a well-
diversified portfolio"); Alok Kumar, Who Gambles in the Stock Market? 3 (Mar. 15, 2005) (unpub-
lished working paper), available at http://www.nber.org/confer/2005/bfs05/kumar.pdf (arguing that
gamblers may hope "to have a positive probability, albeit very small, of reaching their aspiration lev-
els"); Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy
Implications, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 566-67 (1989) (discussing overestimation of the
likelihood of low frequency events in the context of technological hazards); cf Derek E. Bambauer,
Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U.
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Behavioral economics has been briefly explored in one area of patent
law-the area of hindsight bias and consideration of nonobviousness.16
These hindsight examples, however, focus on ex post analysis of the pat-
entability of a popularized invention and do not consider behavioral eco-
nomic implications for the ex ante decision to invest in innovation-the
topic of this paper.
B. The Traditional State-Run Lottery
Winning the lottery is the classic example of an unlikely event. State-
run lotteries are extremely common and popular despite a house rake that
often approaches fifty percent. 7 An attractive rational explanation for the
popularity of lotteries despite the poor odds is that the potential thrill of
winning a jackpot and instant riches has overwhelming appeal, especially
when compared with the slow grind of a daily job.18 This is not meant to
COLO. L. REV. 649, 683 (2006) (noting that "question framing" easily alters risk-preferring behavior). A
pre-Kahneman line of thinking in the same vein is provided by Friedman and Savage in their famous
essay on risk-seeking behavior. Friedman & Savage, supra note 9, at 294-95 (proposing that the jump in
socioeconomic class from a large payout may allow for risk-seeking behavior). Adam Smith provides an
even older example focusing on overly optimistic lottery consumers. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS *20 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co., Ltd.
1904) (1776), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWNtoc.html ("That the chance of
gain is naturally over-valued, we may learn from the universal success of lotteries .... The vain hope of
gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause of this demand.").
16 For academic discussions, see Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demon-
stration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1397-1404
(2006); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before
the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-9 (2007); Colleen M. Seifert, Now
Why Didn't I Think of That? The Cognitive Processes that Create the Obvious, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REv. 489, 504-07 (2008); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind-
sight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95, 106-07 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). For an implicit
court discussion, see Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining
that a particular requirement for proof in the analysis of obviousness is designed to prevent "statutorily
proscribed hindsight reasoning").
17 In the United States, legal lotteries are generally run by the individual states and are quite
popular. In Fiscal Year 2007, the Illinois lottery system, as an example, had sales totaling $2.2 billion.
Of that revenue, only 57 percent was paid out to winners. IllinoisLottery.com, Where Your Lottery
Dollar Goes, http://illinoislottery.com/subsections/News01Text.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2008). See
also McCaffery, supra note 15, at 72-73.
18 This explanation is something of a combination of the theories proposed by Cohen and Choi &
Pritchard. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 712-15 ("Rather than an input in wealth production, the lottery
ticket is an input in creating a sense of open-ended possibility, specifically, the possibility of escaping
one's current life by acquiring great wealth."); Choi & Pritchard, supra note 15, at 15 (explaining that
middle-class individuals engage in lottery-like investment behavior in hopes that they "will become rich
enough to leave their everyday jobs and lifestyles behind"). State lotteries usually fund popular pro-
grams such as education and youth programs. It is conceivable that some purchasers value the charity
aspect of the purchase. This is almost certainly true for private charity lotteries and auctions. However,
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imply that lottery consumers are not hard working people. In fact, lottery
tickets are unreliable and impractical as a sole means of wealth generation.
Rather, lottery consumers diversify their sources of income by continuing
to work regular jobs and only allocate a portion of their income to the lot-
tery. 19 The question of whether playing the lottery is rational behavior does
not turn out to be critically relevant. Rather, as we discuss, it is the behavior
that is important.
Most lottery tickets have several common features, including a low
price, a low probability of winning, and a large payout award.2 Using these
numerical values, a person could calculate the mathematically expected
payout of a ticket, or conversely, the house rake."
Generally, a lottery ticket should be more desirable if it has a higher
expected value based on its comparatively lower cost, higher probability of
winning, or larger potential payout. At first glance, these inputs appear to
be controlled by the lottery originator. The ticket-purchaser, however, actu-
ally has some control over both increasing the probability and reducing
cost. For instance, the probability of winning can be adjusted by purchasing
more tickets22 while the cost can be lowered by forming partnerships with
other buyers.23 Likewise, the purchaser can alter the potential payout by
we have no evidence that state-run lotteries engender any more donative goodwill than would a for-
profit operation. Interestingly, lottery winners are not any happier than the rest of us. Philip Brickman,
Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?,
36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 920 (1978).
19 See John L. Mikesell, State Lottery Sales and Economic Activity, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 165, 170
(1994) (finding a positive correlation between income and lottery play).
20 Cohen, supra note 15, at 712; Charles T. Clotfelter & Philip J. Cook, On the Economics of State
Lotteries, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 108-09 (1990).
21 Cohen, supra note 15, at 712 (providing a series of equations to represent the lottery ticket
model). Although there is some variation among states, the expected payout for a lottery ticket is often
about fifty cents on the dollar. Clotfelter & Cook, supra note 20, at 107.
22 Purchasing more tickets would also have the negative result of higher total costs.
23 In addition to obvious transaction costs, partnerships will reduce the potential payout because
the money will be divided amongst several people. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 719 (explaining that by
purchasing more tickets in a lottery or sharing in the purchase of tickets, a player increases the probabil-
ity of winning but does not increase the value of winning the prize). Some of the potential problems of
common informal lottery purchase partnerships are discussed in Stephen F. Thompson, Note, Contracts
to Split Lottery Prizes: What Happens When the Ticket is a Winner?, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 201, 202-
09 (1994) (discussing cases where parties holding winning tickets refused to acknowledge the existence
of a preexisting partnership agreement). See, e.g., Man Gets Half of Lotto Winnings . . . for Now,
EDMONTON SuN, Nov. 30, 2006, at 46.
Lottery partnership appears to be used as a way to increase the odds of winning at the cost of a
reduced jackpot payout. In practice, groups of friends or coworkers often pool funds together to pur-
chase a set of tickets and then share any payout. In that situation, a pool manager typically receives a
small portion as an administrative fee. U.S. laws prevent the formation of larger 'professional' syndi-
cates that are quite popular in other countries such as the U.K. E.g., eLottery, http://www.elottery.com
(last visited Aug. 27, 2008). Interestingly, this phenomenon of preferring lower risk rather than higher
potential returns follows the traditional notion of risk aversion but runs counter to other behavioral
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choosing amongst various types of tickets, such as a scratch-off game,
Powerball, Pick-Three, and so on.24 Ticket type selection adjusts the payout
because some tickets have a relatively low potential payoff value (such as
$2,000, for example) while others have a much larger payoff (perhaps as
high as $300 million).25 The variety of tickets available for sale does, how-
ever, limit ticket type selection, and the upper limit of the most risky ticket
type bounds the maximum potential payoff. The State determines the final
variable-expected payout.26 Since the consumer cannot usually influence
the maximum potential payoff, State policy must ensure that the payoff is
high enough to incentivize purchases. Likewise, although partnership is
available to share the price of a single ticket, a very low ticket price gener-
ally avoids the need for that additional transaction.
Lotteries have a long history as vehicles for revenue generation. 7
Modem lotteries are no different, and their primary purpose is to raise funds
for public spending. Public finance presents two primary complaints
against revenue generation via the lottery system. The first complaint is that
high variation in lottery revenues makes it difficult to properly plan and
economic evidence indicating that lottery players prefer higher jackpots over higher probabilities of
winning. Speculatively, the group dynamic and diversification may play a role in the purchase decisions.
This phenomenon also gives us pause to remember that individuals suffering under the "lottery effect"
do not ignore the low probability of winning. Rather, the lottery effect simply results in individuals
valuing a marginal increase in the jackpot greater than a marginal increase in the probability of winning.
24 Various game names change rapidly based on marketing concerns. A glossary of lottery terms
is provided by the online gambling advice web site "il dado." Lotto Lottery Glossary,
http://www.ildado.com/lotteryglossary.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
25 Emily Oster, Are All Lotteries Regressive? Evidence from the Powerball, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 179,
180 (2004). Powerball drawings are progressive so that if no winner is picked for a given drawing, the
current jackpot "rolls over," potentially resulting in a very large jackpot. Id. ("[J]ackpots have reached
as high as $300 million.").
26 In Missouri, 63 percent of state lottery income is distributed to winners. Missouri Lottery:
Where the Money Goes, http://www.molottery.com/where the moneygoes/where the money_
goes.shtm (last visited Aug. 27, 2008). The remaining 37 percent is used to fund education, compensate
lottery retailers, and fund the lottery administration. Id. In Fiscal Year 2006, 57 percent of state lottery
income was distributed to winners of New Jersey state lotteries. N.J. STATE LOTrERY COMM'N, NEW
JERSEY LOTTERY ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lottery/general/
audit reports/FY%202006%20Financial%20Statements.pdf. During Fiscal Year 2007, 57 percent of
state lottery income was distributed to the winners of Illinois state lotteries. IllinoisLottery.com, supra
note 17.
27 Anisha S. Dasgupta, Public Finance and the Fortunes of the Early American Lottery, 24
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 227, 235-50 (2006) (providing a close study of six eighteenth century New Haven
lotteries); Zeng Zhonglu & Zhang Dongmei, A Profile of Lottery Players in Guangzhou, China, 7 INT'L.
GAMBLING STUD. 265, 265 (2007) (tracing lotto purchases to the Han dynasty); Frances Stokes Berry &
William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM.
POL. ScI. REv. 395, 401-02 (June 1990).
28 Dasgupta, supra note 27, at 227-28.
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budget for public spending.29 The second complaint is that, although more
than half of all Americans buy lottery tickets,3" poor and uneducated con-
sumers are more likely to play than are other socioeconomic groups.3 (In-
terestingly, at least one study shows that more wealthy and educated indi-
viduals are more likely to purchase lottery tickets as the jackpot size in-
creases.32) Part IV will revisit these critiques to suggest how the patent lot-
tery may be better managed.
C. The Lottery Effect in Other Realms
Unsurprisingly, people do not limit their practice of betting on long
odds to lottery play or gambling. Several studies chronicle overweighting of
long odds in a variety of settings, such as stock market investing,33 entre-
preneurship,34 acting,35 frivolous litigation,36 purchase of insurance,37 and
others." Here, our focus is on patenting and innovation.
29 See Mikesell, supra note 19, at 166 (discussing various economic factors that may ultimately
influence lottery ticket sales).
30 Clotfelter & Cook, supra note 20, at 105.
31 The lottery thus operates regressively. Ross Rubenstein & Benjamin Scafidi, Who Pays and
Who Benefits? Examining the Distributional Consequences of the Georgia Lottery for Education, 55
NAT'L TAX J. 223, 226 (2002); John W. Welte et al., Gambling Participation in the U.S.-Results from
a National Survey, 18 J. GAMBLING STUD. 313, 334, 336 (2002); CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J.
COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 100-01, 226-27 (1989); MARY 0. BORG ET AL.,
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STATE LOTTERIES 10-11 (1991); John L. Mikesell & C. Kurt Zorn,
State Lotteries as Fiscal Savior or Fiscal Fraud: A Look at the Evidence, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 311,
315-16 (1986). These fiscal complaints are in addition to the traditional complaints that the lottery is
immoral, a sin, and that lottery play creates a set of negative externalities. See, e.g., Martin McKee &
Franco Sassi, Editorial: Gambling with the Nation's Health?, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 521, 521 (1995).
32 Emily Oster, supra note 25, at 180 (finding results that suggest that regressivity is partially
alleviated by increasing the jackpots of lotto games).
33 Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securi-
ties Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 665-67 (1995) (contending that trading volume often represents
speculative trades on the part of investors with heterogeneous expectations on the value of companies).
34 Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Galina Vereshchagina, Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs 1, 15-16 (Roches-
ter Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 500, 2003), available at http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/
RCERPAPERS/rcer500.pdf; Thomas Astebro, The Return to Independent Invention: Evidence of
Unrealistic Optimism, Risk Seeking or Skewness Loving?, 113 ECON. J. 226, 236 (2003).
35 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 1, 42-45 (2001).
36 Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163,
163 (2000) ("[T]he decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and
risk-averse behavior in defendants.").
37 See infra note 53 (discussing insurance).
38 Jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1524-25, 1541-42; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1183.
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II. THE PATENT LOTTERY
A. Describing the Long Tail
The patent system has its own lottery.3 9 Numerous studies have shown
39 The underlying concept of the lottery example in intellectual property is discussed in Professor
F.M. Scherer's chapter on the innovation lottery. F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery. The Empirical
Case for Copyright and Patents, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3-21 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
A number of writers have recognized that the patent system operates as a lottery. Jonathan A. Barney, A
Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30
AIPLA Q.J. 317, 326, 328 n.30 (2002) ("A patent is not unlike an expensive lottery ticket; you pay your
money up front and hope for the big payoff."; "[T]he so-called 'lottery effect' may encourage some to
over-invest in highly speculative technologies that have the seductive allure of potentially huge eco-
nomic rewards, but very little, if any, realistic probability of success."); JOHN JEWKES ET AL, THE
SOURCES OF INVENTION 188 (2d ed. 1969) (noting that critics have described the patent system as "a
lottery in which it is hardly worth while taking out a ticket"); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the
Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 39 (2002) (analogiz-
ing the race to patent to a lottery); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERsP. 75, 79-83 (2005) (comparing patents to lottery tickets and noting that only one tenth of one
percent of patents are ever litigated at trial); Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/09/patentlotterie.html (Sept. 11, 2006); Jeremy Phillips, Edito-
rial, The Patent Lottery, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 567, 567 (2007) ("The value of the patent is in
some respects comparable with that of the lottery ticket."). Cf Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance
of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545, 564-65 (1997) (analogizing patent litigation to a lottery system);
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1530, 1547-48 (2005) (pointing
to particular factors that help predetermine likely losers in the patent lottery but noting that the long lag-
time in biotech and pharmaceutical innovation processes indicates that the patenting incentives covering
those types of inventions are "more like a lottery"); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 25-26
(criticizing the innovation lottery theory); Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes-
Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 147-48
(2005) (noting that a reduced cost of a lesser patent in a two-tier system would be favorable to patent
lottery players looking for the "cheapest ticket"); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:
Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor after Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1355 (2004)
(agreeing that empirical evidence supports a conclusion of "risk loving behavior among inventors");
Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1943
n. 124 (2007) ("Individuals and corporations obtain patents in the hope that one of them will turn into a
winning lottery ticket. Because they cannot know in advance which of their patents will ultimately prove
the winner, they patent everything."); Sean T. Camathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-
Definition of "First-to-Invent", 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 808 n.257 (1998) (noting that the litigation lottery
structure of the patent system is illustrative of inventors' risk-loving propensities).
News reports have also picked up on the lottery schema. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, A
'White Knight' Draws Cries of 'Patent Blackmail', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1990, § 3, at 5 (noting that
patent jury trials are "a 'judicial lottery,' an often unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for
those who are sufficiently aggressive"); Richard B. Schmitt, Juries' Role in Patent Cases Reconsidered,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6 (quoting Wayne State University Law School professor Martin Adel-
man as saying that jury confusion results in "a system of justice that is basically a lottery"). While the
patent lottery metaphor is usually associated with an innovator hoping for success, at least one court
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 149 2008-2009
GEO. MASON L. REV.
that patent values are highly skewed,4" or, in popular parlance, they have a
"long-tail."4 ' The majority of patents are relatively worthless while only a
few are highly valuable with multimillion dollar payoffs.42 This skew in
valuation has been recognized as speculation for over 120 years.43 In the
1883 Fire Extinguisher case, for instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals based
took the lottery example in an alternative direction. In Harford National Bank & Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew
& Co., 188 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D. Del. 1960), the district court noted that intentional patent infringers
are participating in a lottery by betting that the patent will be found invalid or not infringed.
If an infringer may take unto himself the invention of another without any bona fide or rea-
sonable basis for so doing and run the risk only of having to pay at some future time a rea-
sonable royalty for his use of invention, a premium would be placed upon the act of a
wrongdoer, the rights of the inventor under his patent would become illusory, and responsi-
ble people dealing in the patent field would be encouraged to disregard lawful property rights
and participate in a lottery with the winning ticket stamped 'invalid.'
Id. at 357. The Hartford example could appropriately be termed the anti-patent lottery. See also Carole
Kitti, Patent Invalidity Studies: A Survey, 20 IDEA 55, 55-56 (1979) ("[T]he possibility of a court
invalidity judgment can make a newly issued patent a 'lottery ticket'....").
40 Scherer, supra note 39, at 4; Jean 0. Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents and Value Intellec-
tual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405, 410-11
(1998); Barney, supra note 39, at 327-28 (using a cohort of 70,000 patents that all issued in 1986 and a
lognormal extrapolation to explain patent valuation based on patent maintenance fee payments, Barney
calculated a median value of $6,930 and a mean value of $73,340). In a more recent study, James Bes-
sen studied a cohort of patents issued in 1991 and calculated results that are strikingly similar to those of
Barney. James E. Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Characteristics 10 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-46, 2006) (calculating a median value of $7,175 and a mean
value of $78,168). Both of these studies show an order of magnitude difference between the calculated
median and mean value and provide an indication that the patent valuation distribution includes a large
number of lower-value patents and a small number of much more highly valued patents. These values
are perhaps shocking because they show that the median patent value does not even reach the direct
attorney fees associated with obtaining patent protection. See LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM.
INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 21 (2007) (reporting patent prosecution
survey results).
41 See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF
MORE 10 (2006) (explaining that "long tail" is a term used to describe statistical curves where "the tail
of the curve is very long relative to the head"). Here, we turn Anderson's use of the highly-skewed
distribution ninety degrees. Where he focuses on the large variety of low-value products, we are focus-
ing on the few very-high-value items. Although the term long-tail has been used by statisticians, physi-
cists, and economists for many years, Anderson's popular book and blog may have now co-opted the
meaning.
42 At root, a patent provides a legal right to exclude others from practicing the invention covered
by the patent claims. See Moore, supra note 39, at 1546 n.70 ("[L]itigated patents are a subset of all
valuable patents."). Three primary ways to profit from a patent right are: (1) licensing; (2) litigation
damages; and (3) enforcement of market exclusivity to support supracompetitive pricing. See id at
1522-23.
43 In the Fire Extinguisher case, the U.S. Court of Appeals discussed Congress's preference for
protecting the rights of persons engaged in the practical use of machines over "speculators in patents."
Fire Extinguisher Mfg. Co. v. Graham, 16 F. 543, 550-51 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1883). In an earlier 1846 case,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Patent Act of 1836 to give an estate administrator the right to renew a
patent's term, as well as to extend the benefit of such renewal to users of the patented invention. Wilson
v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 681,687 (1846).
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its policy conclusions on a preference for persons engaged in practical use
of machines over "speculators in patents."" Likewise, in an earlier 1846
case, the Supreme Court strained the meaning of the Patent Act of 1836 to
avoid giving any benefit to those who "dealt with the patent rights as a mat-
ter of business and speculation."45 The Fire Extinguisher preference is also
common amongst policymakers who disfavor non-practicing entities that
generate income purely through licensing of patent rights.
4 6
In the patent lottery, a potential innovator decides whether to risk an
attempt at innovation in the hopes that a resulting patent will be among the
winners.47 This speculative process involves many uncertainties including,
inter alia, the uncertainty of whether the attempt will result in a technically
functioning innovation; the uncertainty of whether the innovation will suc-
ceed in the marketplace; and the uncertainty of whether the innovator can
protect the innovation through intellectual property or other means.48 In the
hotly disputed "spring-tooth harrow" cases of the nineteenth century, Judge
A.C. Coxe49 explained:
44 Fire Extinguisher, 16 F. at 551.
45 Wilson, 45 U.S. at 678, 687.
46 See Viet D. Dinh, Yes to the Patent Reform Act, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Dec. 3, 2007),
available at http://www.spectator.org/dsparticle.asp?art id=12378 (last visited Oct. 6, 2008) (discuss-
ing how the Patent Reform Act of 2007 helps cure the problem of "patent trolls").
47 The patent lottery should also be distinguished from patents on lottery technology. See, e.g.,
Int'l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 215 F. App'x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (litigation over patent
covering aspects of New York State Lottery); Lottotron, Inc. v. GTech Corp., No. 05-4562, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82579 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007) (litigation over patented computerized lottery waging sys-
tem); Scientific Games Int'l, Inc. v. Oberthur Gaming Techs., No. 1-02-CV-3224-TWT, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25938 (D. Ga. July 17, 2003) (litigation over patented scratch-off tickets).
48 Thurston v. Reed, 229 F. 737, 747 (D. Mass. 1915) (recognizing "the [notorious] uncertainty
and highly speculative nature of patent values"); E. Bement & Sons v. La Dow, 66 F. 185, 190
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1895) ("[N]o property is so uncertain as 'patent rights'; no property more speculative in
character or held by a more precarious tenure."); Milberg v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 315, 317-18 (1969) (treat-
ing a patent as having speculative value); Rawson v. Harger, 48 Iowa 269, 275 (1878) ("The value of a
patent is purely speculative. It may be worth much or little. He who buys takes his chances ...."). See
also Carnathan, supra note 39, at 808 ("Admittedly, invention is by nature a speculative enterprise.
Whatever the doctrinal regime, inventors must work without knowing whether their work will ever pay
off by yielding a patentable idea, and further must work without knowing whether some other inventor
may complete the conception of the idea first. An overly risk-averse person is not likely to choose to
become an inventor. In fact, inventors are likely among the least risk-averse people on the planet.").
49 The Harrow case was decided rather early in Judge Coxe's judicial career. Judge Coxe went on
to serve on the Second Circuit from 1902 to 1917. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Biography of Alfred Conkling
Coxe, Sr., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=527 (last visited Aug. 27, 2008). During the Taft
administration, Judge Coxe was considered a potential Supreme Court nominee. Albert H. Walker,
Letter to the Editor, His Vote as a Sacrifice: Judge Coxe 's Qualifications, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1909,
at 8.
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It should also be borne in mind that no property is so uncertain as "patent rights"; no prop-
erty more speculative in character or held by a more precarious tenure. An applicant who
goes into the patent office with claims expanded to correspond with his unbounded faith in
the invention, may emerge therefrom with a shriveled parchment which protects only that
which any ingenious infringer can evade. Even this may be taken from him by the courts. In-
deed, it is only after a patentee has passed successfully the ordeal of judicial interpretation
that he can speak with any real certainty as to the scope and character of his invention. Espe-
cially is this true of patents on spring-tooth harrows .... 50
To some extent, the popular press and blogosphere mask the challenges,
impediments, and improbable success faced by a hopeful innovator by
heavily focusing on the small minority of patent cases that result in substan-
tial returns. 1 In behavioral economics, an "availabilty heuristic" has been
defined to explain how, inter alia, news reports of an event's occurrence
increases a person's prediction of the frequency of the event. Here, reports
of successful innovations may well increase the perception of the likelihood
of future success.5 2
B. Defining the Patent Lottery
There are clear parallels between this simple speculation-oriented pat-
ent scenario and the lottery system described in Part I.B. s3 Like a lottery
50 E. Bement & Sons, 66 F. at 190.
5t The 2006 $612.5 million settlement of the NTP v. Research-in-Motion litigation represents a
case-in-point. A LexisNexis news search conducted for articles published between September 7, 2005
and September 7, 2006 resulted in 2,521 news articles discussing the lawsuit and settlement size. Simi-
larly, a search of Technorati, a blog search engine, reveals thousands of articles discussing the settle-
ment. Technorati, http://www.technorati.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
52 Jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1477-78; Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Avail-
ability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REv. 75, 87 (2005).
53 Another analogy-that of insurance-can also be drawn with respect to patents. At first glance,
insurance premiums appear to be almost the exact opposite of lottery purchases. Insurance involves
paying a premium to avoid risk while lottery players are thought to pay a premium to achieve risk. In an
insurance analogy, patents play the role of an insurance policy against a combined risk that (1) an inno-
vation is a practical and market success and (2) non-patent protections insufficiently protect the innova-
tors. In the patent world, this situation often plays out in scenarios when an innovative company fails to
achieve market success but the newly created technology is successfully marketed by another company.
Professor Shubha Ghosh criticizes this insurance model as empirically incorrect, "given the
evidence of risk loving behavior among inventors." Ghosh, supra note 39, at 1355. However, Professor
Ghosh too quickly concludes that the insurance model is incompatible with that of "risk loving" inven-
tors. Rather than opposites, insurance is more aptly described as a mirror image of the lottery. As in the
lottery, insurance purchasers tend to pay a premium against the odds of a long-shot. This mirror-image
analysis was recognized early on by Kahneman and Tversky. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 10,
at 263.
Again with terminology: Patents as insurance should not be confused with patent defense in-
surance or patent enforcement insurance, both of which can be purchased from a handful of carriers. See
Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and Management ofIntellectual Property Risks,
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ticket, an attempted innovation has an expected price, a potential large pay-
out, and a low probability of winning.' The expected private value of the
innovation is a function of the price, payout, and probability. Unlike the
state lottery system, however, the house rake is not defined by these vari-
ables. Part III further develops the concept of the house rake.
An apt criticism here is that the lottery analogizes poorly to patents
and innovation where the variables are, in fact, all theoretical. None of the
inputs to the metaphorical patent ticket price are known to a potential inno-
vator: the ticket price-consisting of the money, time, and opportunity costs
of innovating and then monetizing the innovation-is unknown; the poten-
tial value and timing of a payout is not defined; and the probability of
achieving success is uncertain. On the other hand, in the state-run lottery,
the inputs are all pre-defined: the ticket price is a particular dollar figure;
the jackpot payout is displayed in flashing lights and a payout schedule is
available; the probability of winning and house rake are also known-
although found only in fine print.
The preceding critique, although important to consider, only shows
that the analogy eventually breaks down. Of course, all analogies eventually
break down--otherwise we would be speaking in identities. 5 The lottery
performs the function of a convenient conceptual aide. 6 However, what
matters here is not whether the analogy is close enough. Rather, the impor-
tant issue here is whether potential innovators are acting in a way that is
better explained by behavioral economics.
C. Scherer's Patent Lottery and the "Small" Innovator
Although a number of commentators have drawn parallels between our
patent system and lotteries,57 Harvard Economist F.M. Scherer demon-
strates the parallels most forcefully by providing data showing the skewed
distribution of patent values and illustrating that the expected median return
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 329, 377 (1999) (discussing various intellectual property insurance
policies).
54 This is a simplified approach in a number of respects. More generally, a patent payout would
have a probability distribution function of potential payouts. Researchers have found that the distribu-
tion of invention values fits well to a lognormal distribution. Bessen, supra note 40, at 6; James E.
Bessen, Estimates of Firms' Patent Rents from Firm Market Value 20 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 06-14, 2006); see also Lanjouw et al., supra note 40, at 410.
55 See David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y
109, 109-10 (2005) (criticizing the over-extension of metaphors in the internet-property context).
56 No matter how close the parallel between the state lottery system and the patent system, we
could never make the proof-like claim that the lottery effect exists in patents because it exists in the state
lottery.
57 See sources cited supra note 39.
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is far less than the expected mean return for innovative activities." From
his analysis, Scherer finds "that there are striking regularities in the distri-
bution of rewards to technological innovation. A minority of 'spectacular
winners' appropriate the lion's share of total rewards."59
For several reasons, innovative activity by individual inventors and
small entrepreneurs is generally a much riskier activity as compared with
larger corporate initiatives. Small businesses are more likely to fail, have
less ability to recover from poor investments, have fewer resources for re-
search and development, and generally have an inadequate understanding of
the marketplace.' Scherer suggests that there is an exceptional affinity for
risk taking in these small-time operators, something not found as strongly in
corporate culture. 6 And, that risk-taking affinity may help explain why
many of the "boldest technological innovations" originate outside of large
corporations.62 More recently, an empirical study bolstered this conclusion
by finding that "valuable patents"-or at least patents that have been liti-
gated-tend to be "issued to individuals or small companies, not large
companies."63
D. Criticisms ofApplying the Lottery Analogy
1. Only a Partial Answer
The lottery analogy only provides a partial answer to the question of
why people innovate and protect those innovations through patents. As
Federal Circuit Judge Kimberly Moore argues, in addition to licensing fees
and litigation-related damages, patents are also sought to deter litigation by
a competitor, to deter competitors from entering a field of research, to es-
tablish a patent thicket, and to signal investment value.' There is also a real
distinction between patents and innovation. Many non-patent factors drive
innovation and can in some instances make patents irrelevant.65 These in-
58 Scherer, supra note 39, at 11-12.
59 Id. at 11.
60 Cf id. at 20-21 (noting that risk aversion and greater financial resources of large, well-
established organizations support the belief that the enforcement of intellectual property rights is biased
in their favor).
61 Id. at 20.
62 Id. See also JEWKES ET AL., supra note 39, at 186.
63 John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2004) (using litigation as a
proxy for value). Their study found that larger companies may also tend to purchase those potential
plaintiffs. However, their use of litigation as a proxy value has been rightly criticized as incomplete and
subject to sample bias.
64 Moore, supra note 39, at 1522-23.
65 Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,
3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcrTvITY 783, 803 (1987).
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clude the desire for a first-mover advantage, insurance against potential
market opportunities, and to meet customer demands. Inventors will still
seek patents on inventions that were not developed as a result of these non-
patent incentives. In those cases, the patent rights are simply a bonus for the
inventor.66 Thus, at best, the lottery analogy only explains a part of the in-
centive felt by potential innovators.67
This concern does not disprove the lottery effect. It should, however,
raise a cautionary flag against loose implementation of policies based on
the effect, as there is a potential for undesired interactions of these policies
with the other innovation incentives. As discussed infra, one approach to
avoid interactions is to direct policies toward entities and individuals most
likely operating under lottery assumptions.
2. Problems of Uncertainty
Perfect foreknowledge would destroy the lottery effect because poten-
tial innovators would already know which innovative attempts would result
in high-value patents. Thus, a second concern with the lottery analogy in-
volves its assumption that the future value of a potential innovation is
merely speculative and offers nothing more than a small positive probabil-
ity of achieving a large payout. As it turns out, many common traits of a
subset of valuable patents-those that are litigated--can be identified prior
to issuance of a patent.6" This finding prompted a group of prominent patent
scholars led by John Allison to argue that the lottery analogy cannot be a
full explanation of reasons for patentability.69 Allison's study on valuable
patents uses litigation as a proxy for value, presuming that valuable patents
are more likely to be litigated than those that are worthless.7 " According to
the study, compared to ordinary patents, litigated patents tend to be owned
by domestic companies, be issued to small entities or individuals, cite more
prior art, and contain more claims.7 1 Mechanical, computer, and medical
device patents are also "significantly more likely to be litigated" than those
related to chemical and semiconductor innovations.7 Most of the variables
66 The patent does guarantee some level of public disclosure of the invention, but in many cases,
public disclosure cannot be avoided once the invention is sold. Similarly, the patent right may provide
some incentive for the inventor to pursue further development. However, once granted, patent rights can
also serve to chill the innovation of others.
67 It is entirely plausible that some potential innovators are not swayed in the least by a potential
for a large reward.
68 Allison et al., supra note 63, at 438.
69 Id. at 462.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 438.
72 Id. But see James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes,
96 AM. ECON. REv. 77, 79-80 (2006) (disagreeing with those results).
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identified by Allison are under the control of the patentee, indicating that
the patentee can get a sense of the value of a potential patent during prose-
cution of the patent, if not earlier.
In attempting to provide their own explanation for patenting rates,
Gideon Parchomovsky and Polk Wagner similarly argue that because the
inventive process is knowledge based, it cannot be completely random."
Parchomovsky and Wagner contend that "[u]nlike lotteries, which are com-
pletely random, the inventive process is knowledge based: ex ante informa-
tion (such as technological know-how and industrial expertise) plays a key
role, and to a large extent determines a company's likelihood of success."'74
Even assuming their empirical soundness, these objections are useful
and compelling only in a limited sense and should not cause us to reject the
patent lottery analogy altogether. In particular, the authors of those studies
will undoubtedly recognize that even if a patent exhibits all of the identified
traits of a commonly litigated patent, it is still quite unlikely to be liti-
gated." Thus, even if a patentee uses all of this ex ante knowledge, the odds
are still low that a resulting patent will be valuable. Furthermore, even
when the potential value of a particular innovation is known in advance,
innovation and patenting is still a high-risk activity. There is no guarantee
that a firn's innovation will be successful or that the patent office will
agree with that success and grant the patent application. Ex ante knowledge
of the value of a potential innovation would also fuel patent races, which
creates an additional layer of uncertainty as to who would receive the prize.
At the baseline, even with presumed industry knowledge, "the inventive
process involves a significant degree of uncertainty and some degree of
luck."76
3. Problem of Irrationality
A third concern with the lottery analogy involves a pushback against
the assumption that buyers are "so risk-seeking that they are willing to en-
gage in an activity with a negative expected value."77 In state-run lotteries,
the players may indeed be making "irrational" choices that violate two pri-
mary assumptions of expected utility theory-that of maximizing private
73 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 25.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 63, at 437 (of the 2,925,537 patents in their study, only
6,861, or 0.23%, had been litigated).
76 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 25; Jonathan Douglas Putnam, The Value of Inter-
national Patent Rights 131-33 (May 1996) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Yale University) (on file with
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University) (finding a low correlation between renewal rates and the
number of countries filed for protection-indicating that early-on decision makers have little idea about
the eventual value).
77 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 25.
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utility and that of avoiding risk.7" The patent lottery, however, does not
require that those two assumptions be violated. An important point here is
that rational behavior allows for risk-taking but requires a premium in re-
turn. It is possible that for many potential innovators, the expected payout
from the patent lottery surpasses the costs of the portion of innovative be-
havior associated with the lottery incentive. Furthermore, although the evi-
dence is still inconclusive, data available at least suggests that inventors
may be overconfident and overweight the low probability of reaping a large
reward as predicted by the model.79 At this point, the data on patent return
overvaluation is admittedly only suggestive, and this is an area where more
research is necessary to determine the motivation of innovators in their de-
cisions. As we will discuss in Part IV, this further research is important
because only a correct understanding of innovative behavior can lead us to
policies that are more socially optimal.8"
4. Lotteries and Patent Races
A fourth concern mistakenly raised by commentators is that the lottery
analogy assumes that all inventors compete for the same prize.8' It is true
that in state-run lottery games players are all going after the same prize.
Even in state-run games, however, the winnings are disaggregated. Winners
share the prize when multiple winning tickets are purchased, and multiple
lotteries can run simultaneously. In the patent lottery context, disaggre-
gating is likewise conceptually simple. Each innovation has its own prize
found in its potential market value. That formulation of the model would
thus avoid any problem associated with a single available prize.
78 Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., The Legal Foundation of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV.
93, 129 (2007). It is important to note that a large number of behavioral economic studies have shown
that people do indeed make decisions to engage in activities with negative expected values. See gener-
ally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS
(2008) (discussing how irrational behavior is neither random nor senseless, but systematic and predict-
able); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (Doubleday 2006) (2000) (studying factors be-
hind the stock market boom leading up to the year 2000).
79 Astebro, supra note 34, at 226. Astebro observed that the median return for Canadian individual
inventors was negative, but that the average internal rate of return was positive but did not include a
high risk premium. Id. at 231, 235. The positive rate of return was substantially based on the 0.55% of
the sample that realized returns of over 1,400%. Id. at 235.
80 See Lanjouw et al., supra note 40, at 424-28 (discussing the incentives created in particular
foreign patent systems based on variations in patent term and application and renewal fees).
81 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 25.
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5. One Dimensional
Finally, Parchomovsky and Wagner criticized Scherer's lottery anal-
ogy as overly one-dimensional because it ignores effects of the patent port-
folio.82 By forming a portfolio of patents, the holder is thought to have a
much stronger strategic position.83 Portfolio-based valuation is a more diffi-
cult process, but there is no reason why the patent lottery cannot account for
sets of patents, especially if those groupings of patents make a payout either
larger or more probable. For the purposes of this paper, however, many of
the complicating issues associated with patent portfolios can be largely ig-
nored since the portfolio effect is primarily associated with large, well-
established firms, while this notion of the lottery effect is primarily thought
to be associated with smaller entities and new entrants.
An additional concern against the lottery analogy is that it leads to a
distorted world view by too casually discarding "losing tickets."84 This
complaint has some validity, as unlike most losing tickets in the state-run
lottery, patents can still hold value even when the value is much less than
the hoped-for value. However, this criticism of the lottery analogy creates
no problem since there is no requirement that all benefits of innovation be
tied to the patent lottery. Rather, the patent lottery should complement other
forms of incentives for innovation.85
The majority of criticism directed at analogizing the innovation and
patenting process to the lottery system focuses on the fact that the lottery
does not explain all innovative activity. But those criticisms do nothing, in
fact, to diminish the argument that the lottery analogy explains some of the
innovative incentive felt by some potential innovators.
Although these logic-based criticisms of the lottery effect create inter-
esting straw men, the larger question remains: is it empirically true that a
substantial portion of innovative activity is moved forward by inventors
who have unrealistic or overvalued estimations of the success of their pro-
ject? The strongest evidence indicates that small entrepreneurial companies
and individuals are the ones most likely to take this type of gamble.86 Legal
82 Id. at 58 (noting that "unlike lottery tickets, patents can exhibit superadditivity").
83 Id. at 27.
84 Id. at 26.
85 Id. at 57-58.
86 See Hopenhayn & Vereshchagina, supra note 34, at I (explaining how an option to jump to
another opportunity explains why self-financed entrepreneurs may find it optimal to invest in risky
projects that do not offer any risk premium). For a discussion of entrepreneurial gambling behavior, see
Robert A. Lowe & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Overoptimism and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms,
52 MGMT. SC. 173, 174 (2006) (finding no entrepreneur overconfidence in the decision to establish a
new firm, but finding significant overconfidence in the decision to continue with thus-far unsuccessful
opportunities); Astebro, supra note 34, at 236-37 (noting the behavior of independent inventors to move
forward in the face of discouragement from authorities). See also David L. Hull et al., Renewing the
Hunt for the Heffalump: Identifying Potential Entrepreneurs by Personality Characteristics, 18 J.
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structures such as the availability of bankruptcy and limited liability also
promote risk-taking behavior by eliminating the potential for the most nega-
tive returns on investment.17
III. THE HOUSE RAKE
A. Private Law v. Public Law
We have been discussing the patent lottery analogy in relation to pri-
vate actors such as innovators. The policy decision to hold a lottery, how-
ever, would rarely be based on the private benefit to participants."8 Rather,
lotteries are held for the benefit of the lottery organizers. In a government
or non-profit scenario, the lotteries are thus held for the benefit of the pub-
lic. The private benefit is necessary to induce participation. Thus, odds and
payouts and other inducements are tweaked to ensure that the game is
played. However, the underlying reason for holding the lottery is what we
might term the "house rake."
B. House Rake in the Patent Lottery
In state-run lotteries, the purpose is to collect money to finance public
spending. 9 By contrast, although the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) collects fees,9" those fees are not its reason for existence. In-
stead, the patent system is built on the constitutional justification of promot-
ing the progress of the useful arts.9
In legal terms, the patent system operates to reward innovation and
disclosure by granting exclusive rights to patented inventions. The exclu-
sive rights, while generating a potentially large private benefit for the patent
holder, can have a variety of positive and negative social impacts-namely
increased incentives to innovate and disclose (both with presumptively
positive results) at the cost of potential monopoly rents, dampened competi-
SMALL Bus. MGMT. 11, 15-18 (1980) (finding that a questionnaire of risk-taking propensity differenti-
ated potential entrepreneurs from non-potential entrepreneurs).
87 See Robert H. Brockhaus, Sr., Risk Taking Propensity of Entrepreneurs, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J.
509, 510-11 (1980) (noting entrepreneur's tendency to prefer high risk situations in order to easily
explain failure without assuming personal responsibility); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin:
Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 279 (1991) (discussing some authors'
views that bankruptcy has lost its sting and is a used mechanism for dealing with costly legal situations).
88 Dasgupta, supra note 27, at 260.
89 Id.
90 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2008 FEE SCHEDULE (2008), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2007september30_2008augustOl.htm.
91 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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tion, and interference with follow-on research (all generally considered
negative).92 It is the balance of those social impacts that "finance" the pat-
ent system and serve as the house rake of the patent lottery.
As noted above, this paper presumes that innovation and disclosure
have a net positive social impact while patent exclusivity has a net negative
social impact. That result is somewhat debatable. For instance, "ex post
justifications" of intellectual property rights continue to receive some atten-
tion and push toward the idea that enforcement of intellectual property has
some additional social benefits.93 These ex post justifications generally rely
on benefits of private ownership creating incentives for coordinated control
and investment in further development. For patent rights in particular, this
justification often fails to make even intuitive sense because overlapping
patent rights allow for multiple points of control without any right to use.
Yet, to the extent that ex post justifications are real, those additional costs
and benefits would need to be incorporated into the model.
C. Re-Aligned Interests in Patent Lottery House Rake
In the state lottery, public interests are at odds with private interests.
The state's returns will only be positive if the players' returns are negative.
The patent lottery works a bit differently. Positive social impacts in the
patent lottery do not require a negative expected return for potential innova-
tors. Instead, it is quite possible that both public and private interests benefit
from incentives placed on innovation. In the simplest model, the public
interest must balance any harms associated with exclusivity rents collected
by patentees against the social benefits of innovation.94
Sitting alone, exclusivity is thought to result in a direct drain on social
welfare because of the potential monopoly-like behavior. Economists have,
therefore, encouraged policymakers to grant patent rights "only to the ex-
tent that[] they are necessary to encourage invention."95 In other words, in
92 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1813,
1816-17 (1984) (discussing the conflict between awarding innovation with patent rights and creating
monopolies); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (discussing effects of patent rights on innovation, disclosure, and
investment).
93 Lemley, supra note 92, at 129.
94 See Kaplow, supra note 92, at 1823-26 (arguing that optimal patent life is where the length of
time that the marginal social cost of lengthening or shortening the patent life equals the marginal social
benefit); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (2007)
(discussing spillovers as a social benefit of innovation).
95 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1031
(2005); Kaplow, supra note 92, at 1823-26. The last increment of monopoly pricing is especially prob-
lematic because it results in a large deadweight loss but only minimal increased private profits for the
patentee. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
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an economist's idealized world, patent rights would only be offered when
those rights are necessary to incentivize the innovation effort. For many
reasons, the "just enough" formula is difficult to implement. There is no
known method for effectively discriminating to provide only the necessary
amount of incentive.96 However, information on systematic tendencies can
be useful. Thus, if innovators exhibit some systematic bias in their deci-
sions to innovate, that information could be used to modify the patent poli-
cies which create innovation incentives.
D. Correcting the Skewed Preferences of the Patent Lottery
The lottery effect shows that individuals faced with a low probability
of winning a large payout tend to be swayed more by changes in the size of
the jackpot than by actuarially parallel changes in the probability of win-
ning. This Article assumes that potential innovators actually feel the lottery
effect causing them to exhibit the skewed preferences of the patent lottery
and thus be willing to invest against the actuarial norm. The skewed prefer-
ences in the patent lottery involve probability neglect and overweighting the
value of success, typically by ignoring the low probability of success. Thus,
for a potential innovator captured by the patent lottery effect, a change in
the probability of achieving a successful innovation would have little im-
pact on the innovation incentive. By contrast, a change in the potential pay-
out of successful innovation would be more likely to produce a response in
the potential innovator. As discussed supra, these assumptions about inno-
vator behavior have only been suggested by peripheral studies and have not
been conclusively proven. However, the effect appears more often among
individual inventors and start-up operators.97
A usual response to such bounded rationality is to suggest corrective
measures to help overcome the associated losses. In other words, a policy-
maker may see a market information failure that needs correction and sug-
gest a congenial form of education-based paternalism to help innovators
realize their mistaken calculations. More direct forms of paternalism are
also available to ensure that innovators only innovate when their expected
return on innovation is positive. This Article takes a different approach.
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985,
987 (1999).
96 1 suggest that the issue of incentive discrimination can be thought of as akin to the inability of a
producer to price discriminate according to individual consumer willingness to pay. Here, however,
society would prefer to discriminate by changing the innovation incentive according to the amount
needed to induce the innovative activity. Although addressing a different point, this analysis is implicitly
suggested by Doug Lichtman in his article suggesting the use of government subsidies to ensure phar-
maceutical innovation. Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize
the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 1 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 123-25 (1997).
97 See part II.C.
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Instead of trying to change and correct the behavior of individual innova-
tors, I suggest that policymakers can leverage the potential innovator's
bounded rationality to further society's innovation policy goals.
E. Exploiting the Patent Lottery Effect
To the extent that it exists, the patent lottery effect should not be ig-
nored or extinguished-instead, it should be understood and used to benefit
society. This section proposes a method of applying our knowledge of the
patent lottery and behavioral economics to promote the policy goals of in-
creased innovation and disclosure. In lottery lingo, we exploit the lottery
effect to increase the house rake.98
If we are right that a low probability chance of winning a large patent
payout does induce a skewed incentive effect on potential innovators, then
there are policy options available that can increase the patent lottery's posi-
tive social impact while continuing to encourage the equivalent innovation.
This first step does not require that the patent lottery players make decisions
with negative expected returns. The policy options can be extended further,
however, if the bounded rationality theories of behavioral economics are
indeed applicable to potential innovators in a way that leads to such nega-
tive-return decisions.
Although the expansive language of behavioral economics encom-
passes most of the ways that a patentee may overweigh their chances of
winning a large payout, a simplified formula may be more explanatory to
some. Given a risk-neutral player having an incentive to innovate and pat-
ent (i) based on the chances of achieving a large payout (J) at probability
(P); at first order, i = J*P where the incentive (i) is directly proportional to
the product of the payout (J) and probability (P)." Under the lottery effect,
however, an incremental increase in the payout (J) results in an even greater
increase in the incentive (i). Thus, in equation form, 8i + i > (J + J)*P,
where J > 0. Conversely, under the lottery effect, an incremental decrease
in the probability (P) results in only a small decrease in incentive (i) as
shown by the equation, i - 8i > J*(P - 6P), where 8P > 0.
In our simple model, there are only two levers that alter the incentive
to innovate: (1) the potential value of successful innovation; and (2) the
probability of achieving success. Any number of underlying policy levers
can be identified to influence both the payout and the probability. These
generally may include modification of patentability or litigation rules and
limitations on damages or injunctive relief. A third lever-the up-front cost
of innovation-is the patent lottery equivalent of a ticket price. Raising or
lowering patent office fees or other tax or small business incentives are
98 See Part I.B; Part II.B.
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policy examples that would impact that third lever.'00 A 1976 patent office
appeal recognized some of these potential levers while noting that a poorly
operating patent office has the negative effect of "encouraging fraudulent
speculators in patent rights, deluging the country with worthless monopo-
lies, and laying the foundation for endless litigation.'' ° Although that pa-
rade of horrible outcomes may be overly dramatic,0 2 the underlying mes-
sage is clear-policy levers in the patent system do have an impact on the
activity of patentees.
This model begins with the goal of maximizing positive innovative ac-
tivity while minimizing negative rents associated with strong patent rights.
Attempts to use these innovation levers to take advantage of the lottery in-
centive should follow certain guidelines.
First, to increase innovative activity, regulators should focus on levers
that have a proportionately larger marginal impact on the potential value of
successful innovation-the size of the jackpot. The payout size is the most
important lever for influencing the desire of innovators to innovate. Thus,
an increase in payout size is associated with a large marginal impact on
inventor incentives to innovate but a smaller marginal increase in monopoly
rents. Because the lottery effect indicates that innovators are relatively in-
sensitive to increases in the probability of winning the jackpot, it would be
comparatively fruitless to make changes increasing that probability in the
hopes of increasing innovative activities.
Conversely, if enforcement of patent rights (and consequently rents) is
to be reduced, that reduction will be most effective if applied using levers
that have only a small marginal effect on inventor incentives but a large
marginal impact on monopoly rents. Because the patent lottery effect pre-
dicts insensitivity to changes in the probability of successful innovation,
policies that primarily reduce that lever will have only a small negative
effect on innovative activity accompanied by a larger reduction on the in-
novator's ability to eventually seek monopoly rents.
1. Ramsey, Kaplow, and Ayres
In some ways, this approach can be thought of as building from Louis
Kaplow's famous ratio test for deriving the optimal patent life'0 3 and the
100 Lanjouw et al., supra note 40, at 425-28 (finding that although Patent Office fees consist of
only a small part of the costs of protecting innovation, applicants are quite sensitive to those fees).
101 In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1337 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Miller, J., dissenting).
102 Cf Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innova-
tion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1819-22 (2007) (discussing the flood of low quality patents associ-
ated with a patent registration system that lacked any substantive examination that was available during
the nineteenth century).
103 Kaplow, supra note 92, at 1823-29.
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concept of Ramsey pricing.'14 In his article, Kaplow created a ratio that
compared social benefit of a patent to the monopoly cost to determine the
optimal patent life." 5 Ian Ayres and others have extended that analysis by
looking at patent features other than the term-noting in particular that "[i]f
one margin of protection produces lower patentee profits per dollar of so-
cial loss than another margin, it makes sense to reduce the patentee's enti-
tlement where the ratio is low and to expand the patent entitlement where
the ratio is high"--thus extending Ramsey's ideas fully into the world of
patenting. '0
In the patent lottery, we abstract out from the concept of "patent prof-
its" to consider the incentive effect more generally. Of course, in traditional
economic literature, those two elements may be identical, but the behavioral
economic aspect of the patent lottery requires that we consider the actual
incentive effect rather than actuarial profit.'07 With that abstraction, but still
using the concepts of Ramsey, Kaplow, and Ayres, we can construct the
policy choices in the lottery effect as two ratios based on (1) the marginal
effect of modifying the potential payout on the innovation incentive as
compared to the monopoly cost; and (2) the marginal effect of modifying
the probability of success as compared to the monopoly cost. A large ratio
indicates that the lever in question should be increased while a small or
negative ratio indicates that the lever in question should be decreased.
Our assumptions about the patent lottery indicate that the first ratio
will be high because those captured by the patent lottery tend to overvalue a
change in payout size. Conversely, the second ratio will be high for patent
lottery players because they tend to undervalue a change in probability of
success. The ratios, in slightly modified form, also indicate how far the
policy levers can or should be pushed in either direction. Assume for a
moment that the potential payout is increased by allowing an innovator to
obtain exclusive rights for a broader swath of potential follow-on products.
As the payout lever is ratcheted-up, at some point, the negative effect of
monopoly cost will overtake the benefits of additional innovation. When
that ratio flips,' we know that additional incentives are unlikely to result in
societal gain. Likewise, the probability of success could be altered to best
fulfill the goal of maximizing the benefits of innovation while minimizing
the monopoly costs. The next section discusses one hard limit on the prob-
ability value: it must be above zero.
104 F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 54 (1927); Robert
Cooter, Optimal Tax Schedules andRates: Mirrlees andRamsey, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 756, 764 (1978).
105 Kaplow, supra note 92, at 1825-26.
106 Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 95, at 993.
107 Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 3, at 24.
108 In this scenario, a ratio flips when it drops below one.
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2. Limitations on Uncertainty
As discussed above, even under the lottery effect, there must be some
limits on how far a policymaker can ratchet-down the probability of success
before the ratios begin to normalize. " At an absolute limit, the probability
of success must remain non-zero and positive.
The lottery system works using a low but positive probability of win-
ning a large payout. Rules that provide ex ante certainty significantly re-
duce the lottery incentives, as a person with the winning ticket bets with a
certainty of success. Conversely, a certain loser would not be expected to
take the bet at all. This suggests that the uncertainty of success must be
maintained at some positive level in order to have a lottery effect. The his-
tory of innovation and business development suggests that uncertainty can
never be eliminated from that process."' While understanding the inherent
unpredictability of innovation and business, the thought of encouraging
uncertainty may displease some commentators.
To this point, there is no denying that uncertainty in property rights
creates problems. Unclear property rights may be underdeveloped and also
create noisy information problems leading to exhaustive clearance searches
by risk-averse competitors, for instance. Here, however, we are not talking
about the difference between the stark contrast of certain and uncertain
rights, but rather shades of risk associated with the potential of obtaining
rights and the value of those rights. Decreasing the likelihood of success for
the patent lottery player gives competitors more freedom to ignore the lot-
tery player's probabilistic rights."' That freedom consequently works to
ensure competitive development and avoid monopoly pricing." 2
F. Returning to State Lottery Complaints
We now briefly return to the two common complaints made against
the state lottery system-the volatility of revenue for the state and regres-
sivity-and consider them in the patent context.
In the state lottery, the state's ability to pay a large jackpot is never in
question because lottery boards adjust the jackpot size to ensure that it is
always smaller than the revenue from ticket sales. In the patent system,
however, there is the possibility that a jackpot patent could have a destabi-
lizing economic effect because companies, unlike the state lottery, do not
109 See supra Part III.E.I.
110 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 39, at 76 (discussing how virtually all property rights con-
tain some element of uncertainty).
III Id. at 75-76 (discussing how patents may be considered as probabilistic entities).
112 Regarding uncertainty and delay, see Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 95, at 1028-30 (proposing
delayed adjudication of patent rights as a method of sustaining uncertainty).
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have complete control over the size of the pot. Concerns over jackpot vola-
tility rise as policymakers ratchet-up the potential payout. This volatility
potential played out in 2004 to 2006 as the public feared an injunction
against Research-in-Motion's wireless e-mail service. "
Despite the potential problems created by volatility of revenue, the
concern for regressivity is of more practical importance in the patent con-
text because preliminary evidence suggests a demographic skew in patent
lottery players toward individual inventors and small companies." 4 The
patent lottery may disproportionately encourage patenting by smaller enti-
ties. " 5 In fact, a 2003 study completed for the U.S. Small Business Admini-
stration suggests this very phenomenon." 6 This study found that small in-
novative firms "produce 13-14 times more patents per employee as large
patenting firms.""' 7 Likewise, as shown by Allison, Lemley, Moore, and
Trunkey ("ALMT"), small entities are more likely to litigate their pat-
ents," 8 perhaps creating some competitive chilling effect. Small entities
may also be less likely to fully develop their innovations because of a lack
of resources and market channels. This situation leads to rights that are pro-
tected from use but left underdeveloped or wasted. "9
IV. EBAYv. MERCEXCHANGE AS A PATENT LOTTERY CASE STUDY
A. The Supreme Court Decision
It is common lore that "a right implies a remedy."' 0 However, this is a
partial misstatement, as the two are not inseparable. A patent provides an
exclusive right-a statutory "right to exclude."'' The statute provides that
113 See Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
336 (2005).
114 See Allison et al., supra note 63, at 465 (stating that patents originally issued to individuals and
small businesses are far more likely to be litigated).
115 Id. at468-69.
116 CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBuTION To
TECHNICAL CHANGE 3 (2003), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf.
117 Id.
118 Allison et al., supra note 63, at 462, 465 (using litigation as a proxy for value).
119 See Michael Abramowicz, The Problem of Patent Underdevelopment (Dec. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=873473 (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
120 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 225 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
Liberty Fund 2001).
121 35 U.S.C.S. § 154(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the pat-
entee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States .... ").
Furthermore, 35 U.S.C.S. § 261 (LexisNexis 2008) indicates that, subject to the provisions of the Patent
Act, "patents shall have the attributes of personal property."
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in a civil action, the remedy for violation of that right "may" be injunctive,
with a court order to stop infringing activities."22 Without a time machine,
however, past infringement cannot be enjoined 23 and thus the usual com-
pensation for past infringement is monetary damages. 124 Patent cases up to
now have not used standard compensation for forward-looking infringe-
ment because injunctions to stop the infringement relief have been virtually
automatic in the modem era. '25
The 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C. set the stage for a dramatic shift in patent infringement remedies. At
the district court, the jury in this case found that eBay infringed MercEx-
change's patent and that the patent was not invalid. '26 After the jury verdict,
however, the district court denied MercExchange's motion for permanent
injunctive relief. The district court reasoned that MercExchange's own ac-
tions showed that it, the patentee, would not be irreparably harmed in the
absence of an injunction. In its ruling, the district court cited a number of
factors that led to denial of the injunction. These factors includ7ed: MercEx-
change's failure to commercially practice its patented invention, 27 Mer-
cExchange's willingness to nonexclusively license to would-be infring-
ers,128 a failure to request a preliminary injunction,'29 the current political
122 35 U.S.C.S. § 283 (LexisNexis 2008) ("[C]ourts ... may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
deems reasonable."); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006).
123 Time travel may become more widely available if and when the Worlesly-Twist warp drive
becomes operational. See U.S. Patent Application. No. 20030114313, available at http://appftl.uspto.
gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sectl=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=l&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-
bool.html&r-l&f-G&l=50&col=AND&d=PG01&sl=%22warp+drive%22.TTL.&OS=TTL/. If the
patent examiner is correct, the world will never see this warp drive in action because the invention is
"inoperable." Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), http://patentlyo.com/patent'
2006/02/ptorequests_mo.html (Feb. 19, 2006).
124 Under 35 U.S.C.S. § 284, damages for infringement are compensatory and should reach at least
the level of a reasonable royalty. Furthermore, the court may increase the compensatory damages up to
three-fold. 35 U.S.C.S. § 284 (LexisNexis 2008). In exceptional cases, the court may also award attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party. Id § 285.
125 Brief for Fifty-Two Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), at 4, available at
http://patentlyo.com/eBay/eBayLemley.pdf.
126 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), rev'd in part, 401
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cit. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). In particular, eBay's "Buy-it-Now" feature
on its auction website was found to infringe MercExchange's U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265. Id. at 698.
Thus, the patent covers a software implementation of a method of doing business, or, in other words is a
"business method patent." eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
127 MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
128 id.
129 id.
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upheaval over business method patents,13° and the potential difficulty in
enforcing an injunction because of the contentiousness of the litigation. 13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) re-
versed, finding that the district court improperly denied the permanent in-
junction:
If the injunction gives the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural conse-
quence of the right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend
to compete in the marketplace with potential infringers .... We therefore see no reason to
depart from the general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent in-
fringement absent exceptional circumstances. 
132
The CAFC dismissed each of the lower court's reasons for denying the in-
junction, finding that none of them presented "the type of important public
need that justifies the unusual step of denying injunctive relief' and re-
versed the denial of injunctive relief.'33
The Supreme Court subsequently granted eBay's petition for a writ of
certiorari and issued an opinion vacating both the CAFC and district court
decisions.3 3 Addressing the CAFC, the Court spelled out the traditional
four-factor test of equitable relief and announced the test's applicability to
patent cases.
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction .... These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the
Patent Act. 135
Assessing the district court's decision, the Court concluded that the pat-
entee's "willingness to license its patents" and its failure to commercialize
the patented invention do not justify a finding that the patentee would not
suffer irreparable injury if an injunction did not issue. 136 The Court held that
130 Id.
131 id.
132 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S.
388 (2006). Regarding the grant of a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement, fifty-two law
professors signed on to the amicus brief filed by Professor Mark Lemley, arguing, inter alia, that: "[I]n
the last twenty years [the Federal Circuit] has never in fact permitted a district court to deny a permanent
injunction on equitable grounds ... " Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 125, at 2.
133 MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
134 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
135 Id. at 39 1.
136 Id. at 393 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va.
2003), rev'd in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
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such a "categorical rule . . . cannot be squared with the principles of eq-
uity."
B. Application of the Patent Lottery Model to eBay v. MercExchange
There are a number of reasons why an injunction is the preferred relief
and increases the litigation value of a patent even when compensatory dam-
ages can be calculated and are otherwise available. Perhaps, most notably,
an injunction allows a patentee to demand a much higher level of hold-up
costs compared with what the court would award. The fact that many pat-
ents cover just a small portion of a product only exacerbates the hold-up
costs, yet an injunction to stop the infringement may force the entire prod-
uct out of the market. '37
At a high level, the Supreme Court's eBay decision relaxed the general
rule so that injunctive relief is now only available to successful patentees on
a case-by-case basis. At first glance, the decision appears to lessen the aver-
age value of patents by reducing the probability of an injunction. At the
same time, however, the decision may benefit the general public by avoid-
ing the extreme market losses associated with forcibly removing a product
from the public's domain of choices.' The question then arises regarding
what impact eBay has on the patent lottery effect. Or, in other words, what
is the impact of this case on a potential innovator's perception of the low
probability of winning a large payout as compared to the cost of innova-
tion? For innovators captured by the bounded rationality of behavioral eco-
nomics, the arguable answer is that the impact on innovation is likely mini-
mal.
As mentioned in Part III, the lottery effect is associated with the phe-
nomena of overweighting the size of a potential payout while neglecting to
fully consider the actual probability of obtaining the payout.'39 Since in-
junctive relief is still potentially available, eBay did nothing to reduce the
maximum size of the potential payout. Rather, the decision reduces the
probability of obtaining the maximum payout by adding an additional set of
factors.
The Court also explicitly rejects the notion of adhering to any bright-
line rules during the injunction decision that would tend to create a sense of
137 See Douglas Gary Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process 1 (John M.
Olin Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at
http://law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index.html (stating that a patent holder whose patented technology is
revealed after it has gained widespread acceptance can demand a royalty payment greater than the
marginal value of the patented technology).
138 Injunctive relief is associated with particularly extreme gauging of social welfare because
products are physically forced off the market-absolutely removing competition.
139 See supra Part III.
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certainty. 4 ' In fact, the Court gives little real guidance as to which patents
and patent holders might warrant injunctive relief.'4' Because the newly
revived four-part test for injunctive relief depends on the activities and
status of a future infringer as well as the patent owner at the conclusion of
an infringement case, it is unlikely that the details of the test will give much
ex ante certainty to a potential innovator. The impact of eBay on innovation
decisions deserves even further discounting because the decision to inno-
vate is always made years before a decision on an injunction, which re-
quires a patent first be issued by the PTO and then fully litigated in federal
court. In addition, as ALMT show, litigated patents are more likely than
others to have been sold or reassigned, adding further uncertainty to the
expected down-the-road position of the patent holder. 42
Finally, eBay's spillover impact on non-lottery motivations for innova-
tion appears quite limited for at least three reasons. First, the decision does
not negatively influence non-patent motivations for innovation because
those motivations rely neither on patents themselves nor the potential pay-
off of the patent. Second, other motivations besides innovation for patent-
ing, such as defensive measures, blocking, and signaling, should not be
dampened by this decision, as those motivations do not rely directly on a
big litigation payoff. Finally, recent evidence shows that major market
players using patents to gain a competitive marketplace advantage appear
well-positioned to continue to be awarded injunctive relief.'43 For those
established players, the erosion of customer base or market share by a com-
petitor will provide evidence of irreparable harm. " Thus, the eBay decision
falls in line with many of the proposed guidelines for tweaking the lottery
incentive to reduce the monopoly costs of patenting. "I
140 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that the decision to
grant or deny injunctive relief is at the district court's discretion).
141 See Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will Grant
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 72 (2007) (creating a model of
how courts will likely apply the four-factor test); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v.
MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 631, 633 (2007) (stating that subsequent lower court decisions suggest that the
eBay opinion did not significantly affect their decision to grant or deny an injunction).
142 Allison et al., supra note 63, at 465.
143 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 141.
144 id.
145 Cf In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Ci. 2007) (the en banc decision essen-
tially reduced the probability of obtaining treble damages for willful infringement and can be analyzed
as parallel to the eBay decision).
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C. Application of the Patent Lottery Model to Other Cases
1. Changing the Standard of Obviousness
The patent lottery model also applies to the Supreme Court's 2007 de-
cision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.' In KSR, the Supreme
Court expanded the number of patents that may be invalidated as obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).'47 In patent lottery terms, KSR reduces the prob-
ability of obtaining a successful patent, but leaves the potential ultimate
payout unchanged. In an even more pronounced way than the eBay deci-
sion, KSR provides very little guidance to potential innovators as to how to
apply the new rules of obviousness beyond the suggestions of "common
sense" and "flexibility."' 48
There are, however, several important differences between KSR and
eBay that impact the analysis of the lottery effect in each case. First, the
issue of obviousness is less likely to be neglected during the innovation
process than is the potential for injunctive relief. Obviousness is the major
question of patentability and is often the first issue that arises in patent
prosecution. On the other hand, the eBay injunction issue would not arise
until after a patent has issued and has been fully litigated. Both the earlier
timing and central importance of the obviousness question arguably make
the policy choices of KSR less subject to the patent lottery effect. Second,
the KSR decision is unlikely to be cabined to a select group of cases involv-
ing small entity innovators. Rather, the issues of obviousness decided in
KSR permeate throughout all levels of patent applicants. Thus, KSR has the
complicating feature of greater spillover impact into the non-lottery motiva-
tions for innovation.
2. Changing the Standard of Patentable Subject Matter
The final example involves statutory subject matter under § 101 of the
Patent Act.'49 Section 101 limits the type of inventions patentable to any
"process, machine, manufacture, or composition."'5 ° Numerous challenges
146 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
147 Id. at 1739. Under the patent laws, an invention must be new, useful, nonobvious, and fall
within one of the statutory classes of inventions in order to be eligible for patent protection. 35 U.S.C.S.
§§ 101-03 (LexisNexis 2008).
148 See Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
39, 53-54 (2008) (arguing that the problem with the Supreme Court's "flexible" approach to obvious-
ness is that "[w]hether something is implicitly motivated and obvious is nothing more than a subjective,
inscrutable judgment call").
149 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (LexisNexis 2008).
150 id
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have been mounted to the common interpretation of this statute by both
innovators hoping to expand the scope of patentable subject matter and by
the PTO and accused infringers hoping to narrow the scope.' These cases
generally involve attempts to eliminate an entire swath of innovations from
coverage under the patent laws.152 The problem with eliminating a particu-
lar area of technological innovation from patent coverage is that it pushes
the probability of creating a valuable patent all the way to zero. As dis-
cussed in Part III, the patent lottery effect will only operate when the per-
ceived probability of success is non-zero and positive. Thus, technological
innovation not protected by patent coverage will not be able to take advan-
tage of the patent lottery effect.
CONCLUSION
The lottery analogy provides a useful construct for examining a subset
of innovative incentives that may not conform to traditional expected utility
theory. Rather than correcting for innovator's bounded rationality, I pro-
pose that the over-optimism of entrepreneurs and inventors be harnessed to
produce positive effects in social policy. Evidence suggests that many po-
tential innovators overweight the potential value of a successful innovation
but tend to ignore the low probability chance of reaching that success. This
skewed perception, the so-called patent lottery effect, allows for differential
application of various policy levers to increase the incentive to innovate
while avoiding some monopoly costs associated with granting patent rights.
By taking advantage of the lottery effect, policymakers can increase social
welfare.
There is a need for more empirical research in this area. We need a
better understanding of the social costs and benefits of patent incentives, as
well as the various incentives to innovate and how they interoperate. In
addition, the interesting results emerging from the field of behavioral eco-
nomics have not been applied to the field of innovation in any depth. This
Article suggests one approach for such a study.
151 One particular case, In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3246, at *1 (Fed Cir.
Feb. 15, 2008) (en banc), is now pending before an en banc panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit. That case involves the patentability of so-called "mental processes" that are not tied to any
particular machine or result in any physical transformation of a physical article. Posting of Dennis
Crouch to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/bilski-full-caf.html
(Feb. 15, 2008).
152 Some famous historical patentable subject matter cases include, inter alia, Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 178-79 (1981) (patentability of computer implemented inventions), Diamond v. Chakra-
barry, 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980) (patentability of a living organism), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
586-88 (1978) (patentability of a mathematical algorithm), and State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (patentability of a data processing system).
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